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The Military Topography of Syria’s South 
Fickle External Support for Moderates; Resurgent Islamic State in Birthplace of the Revolt 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
The Russian air attacks on Aleppo have diverted attention from Moscow’s intervention 
intended to secure Bashar al-Assad’s position in Damascus. Extending beyond northern 
Syria, Moscow’s direct military involvement has instilled fear in the countries backing 
the non-Jihadist rebel units in the south. Known as the Southern Front, they are based 
in the area stretching from south of the capital to the Jordanian border and close to the 
Israeli border. Hardline Islamist rebels, as well as so-called Islamic State (IS), are poised 
to gain as moderates are undermined. A rethink on ways to empower the Southern 
Front and once more put pressure on Assad is overdue if the region and its civil struc-
tures are to escape capture by the regime and further penetration by the Jihadists is to 
be prevented – scenarios that could create a new wave of refugees towards Jordan. Due 
to the south’s strategic importance, Israel has emerged as a veto player in the neigh-
borhood, helping to curb Russian bombing as Moscow acts with different interests in 
the south and the north. 
 
Southern Syria has been spared the war of 
all-against-all that has plagued many non-
regime controlled areas in Syria. Inter-rebel 
violence has been relatively contained, part-
ly due to the societal nature of the south. A 
culture of tolerance, higher education and 
strong family links has helped to produce a 
backbone of moderate forces in the Hauran 
Plain (see Map, p. 4), where the first mass 
protests against four decades of Assad fami-
ly rule broke out in March 2011. The area 
stretches from the outskirts of Damascus to 
the border with Jordan and the foothills of 
the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In 2014, 
two years after the revolt had become mili-
tarized, non-Jihadist rebel groups formed 
the Southern Front. The formation is 
backed by a disjointed grouping known 
as the Military Operations Centre (MOC). 
Based in Jordan, it consists of Western 
nations (United States, United Kingdom 
and France), Arab countries (Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) 
and Turkey. Jordanian intelligence has 
helped to keep hardline Islamist rebels 
in the south, such as the al-Qaeda-linked 
Nusra Front, in check, in contrast with 
northern regions on the border with Tur-
key. The spread of Islamic State (IS) was 
also contained to two pockets straddling 
Deraa governorate. But in 2016, the group 
mounted a sustained infiltration from the 
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Euphrates River basin that brought it closer 
to the Hauran Plain and the Jordanian 
border. 
Rebel Setbacks 
Support for the moderate rebels in the 
south lost momentum after the Russian 
intervention, which re-opened a recruiting 
avenue for the Nusra Front and other ultra-
hardline rebels who market themselves as 
unwavering in their Jihadism against the 
Assad regime. In July 2016, the Nusra Front 
renamed itself the “Front for the Conquest 
of the Levant” and broke off organizational 
ties with al-Qaeda. 
The non-Jihadists had stolen a march on 
the hardliners by playing a more pro-active 
role in the war against Assad since the for-
mation of the Southern Front. As outside 
support for the new formation grew, reli-
ance on the Nusra Front to help fight 
Assad’s forces lessened. But Moscow’s inter-
vention has reversed strategic rebel gains 
that had the potential to threaten Assad’s 
hold on Damascus. Despite internal rival-
ries and the competing interests of the 
MOC members, the Southern Front had 
kept growing as a force – until the Russian 
intervention in September 2015. 
At the beginning of 2015, Southern Front 
units along with other rebels captured 
Shaykh Maskeen, a hub for Assad’s forces 
on the old Deraa-Damascus road. By mid-
2015, the rebels had encroached on the 
regime’s buffer zone around Damascus 
through an area called the Triangle of 
Death. This covers southern approaches to 
the capital in the Qunaitira and Deraa 
governorates, and has its pivot at the town 
of Kanaker, 30 kilometers from Damascus. 
As the Russian bombardment hit the rebel 
backlines in the south, the backers of the 
Southern Front made it clear to their allies 
that they would not support operations in 
the Triangle of Death. Assad’s forces and 
their Iranian-backed Hezbollah ally cap-
tured Shaykh Maskeen in January 2016, 
after the town was pulverized by Russian 
aerial bombardment. 
The Southern Front 
Nominally includes more than 50 bri-
gades, comprising most of the units 
fighting under the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) banner in southern Syria. A few 
large brigades, with an estimated com-
bined strength of 8,000 fighters, form 
the core of the formation. They are 
drawn from FSA units in the southern 
suburbs of Damascus, the Qunaitira 
and Deraa governorates. The main 
components of the Southern Front in-
clude: 
Shabab al-Sunna: spearheaded a 
Southern Front attack in 2015 that 
captured the ancient city of Busra al-
Sham. Shabab al-Sunna is strongly 
supported by the United Arab Emirates. 
The Artillery Regiment: The only 
rebel unit with a substantial arsenal 
of artillery and rockets. 
Al-Furqan Brigade: Pragmatic 
Salafists who cooperate with more 
secular brigades and have been in a 
de-facto truce with the regime in their 
home region of Kanaker since 2014. 
Al-Mutaz Billah: One of the first 
rebel units in Syria to operate under 
the FSA banner. Headed by Khaled al-
Nabulsi, a colonel who defected from 
Assad’s air force. 
Al-Yarmouk Army: A large forma-
tion seen as close to the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood and linked to Turkey and 
Qatar. 
The Syria Revolutionaries Front: 
Suffered a blow in March 2016 when 
its head, Captain Abu Hamza al-Nuaimi, 
was killed in car-bomb attack in the 
governorate of Qunaitira. But the group 
remains a player in the area. 
Al-Hamza Brigade: Based in the town 
of Ankhil, scene of an attack blamed 
on IS that killed nine members of the 
group. 
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In another major gain for regime forces, 
in November 2016 rebels evacuated the 
Palestinian refugee camp of Khan Eshieh, 
20 kilometers southwest of Damascus, after 
a two-month siege. Under a surrender deal 
guaranteed by Russia, 2,000 to 3,000 people 
were transferred by buses, mainly to the 
northern province of Idlib. They mostly 
comprised fighters from the Southern 
Front, the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham group and 
the Nusra Front, as well as their families. 
By the time of the evacuation, 8,000 Pales-
tinian refugees were still in the camp, 
along with several thousand Syrians who 
had fled Damascus suburbs overrun by the 
regime. Ahrar al-Sham, which is not in 
the Southern Front, traded blame with the 
other rebels for failing to open a supply line 
to Khan Eshieh from the south. Ultimately, 
it was local commanders from the various 
rebel factions in the camp who decided that 
they could no longer cope with the siege 
and the aerial bombardment. 
The capture of Khan Eshieh highlighted 
the Russian-backed ‘piecemeal’ strategy 
employed by the regime and its Shiite 
militia allies from Lebanon and Iraq. The 
strategy focuses on attacking and besieging 
a single rebel city, town or neighborhood 
at a time, destroying it, and then moving 
on to adjacent areas. In the areas around 
Damascus, for example, the fall of Khan 
Eshieh was preceded by the fall of the sub-
urb of Daraya, which was besieged for 
years. But Russia’s halting of rebel advances 
from the south was crucial for the regime, 
as it added a layer to the buffer zone 
around Assad’s seat of power. 
The other – and more high-profile – goal 
of Moscow’s intervention was to push back 
a Turkish and Gulf-backed rebel alliance 
in northern Syria. The alliance, named the 
Army of Conquest (Jaish al-Fath), had ad-
vanced through the coastal province of 
Latakia, home to Russia’s main military 
bases in Syria. The core of the alliance con-
sisted of the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, 
which have been less significant players 
in Deraa and other rural regions in south-
ern Syria. After the Russian intervention,  
Map: Southern Syria 
however, with salaries being cut and re-
sources dwindling, several Southern Front 
commanders reported increased defections 
from their units. The defectors mainly 
headed to Qunaitira governorate and were 
recruited by the more radical Ahrar al-
Sham. Organized criminality is also re-
ported to be on the rise on the Hauran 
Plain as a result of the rebels being forced 
to abandon some fronts against the regime, 
creating larger numbers of idle fighters. 
Operational Failures 
The retreat of the southern rebels has high-
lighted the growing military asymmetry 
generated by the upgraded weaponry that 
the regime has been receiving from Russia 
and Iran, and the difficulty of taking re-
gime bases without air support. 
Organizationally, the Southern Front has 
suffered from huge gaps in coordination 
and from mistrust between its different 
local and ideological components, which 
retain strong allegiances to their home 
areas, even if the latter have been a barrier 
against the Jihadists. These flaws came to 
the fore just before the Russian interven-
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tion in the failure of a major offensive, 
dubbed the ‘Storm of the South’, to take 
the provincial capital of Deraa. The offen-
sive was launched despite lacking an over-
all command. Several rebel clusters failed 
to move together from different directions, 
leaving the regime able to concentrate on 
repelling individual attacks. 
Lacking firepower, the Southern Front 
has mostly stopped outright its attacks to 
take cities and towns from the regime. The 
rebels have instead shifted to trying to iso-
late regime areas by controlling roads. In 
turn, the regime has increasingly protected 
roads with fortifications and dugouts. In 
the fall of 2016, the rebels sought to restrict 
the regime’s access by road to Deraa city, 
which – like the rest of the Hauran Plain – 
has been divided for years, with loyalist 
forces holding about three quarters of the 
city and the rebels the rest. The operation 
depended on taking a regime fortification 
southwest of Shaykh Maskeen. The attack 
failed, and up to 50 rebels who had trained 
as assault troops were killed. 
Squabbling Arab Backers 
Lack of agreement among the Arab and 
Western countries supporting the Southern 
Front on strategic goals has exacerbated 
the fragmentation of the rebels. Most MOC 
members were scared off by the Russian 
intervention, with Jordan and the United 
Arab Emirates initially seeing an oppor-
tunity to ally with Moscow and cut off sup-
port for the rebels. Others, particularly 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, were not as keen. 
The differences have been especially acute 
between the MOC’s Arab members – Jordan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates — who often push rebels in dif-
ferent directions and play off one group 
against the other. In May 2016, the four 
countries supported a US-led drive to create 
a joint leadership for the Southern Front, 
but then contributed to undermining it 
when it came to implementation and move-
ment of staff. After a series of meetings in 
Jordan, a seven-member command was 
chosen, headed by Hassan Ibrahim, a for-
mer major who had defected from Assad’s 
army and eventually joined the opposi-
tion’s High Negotiation Committee (HNC) 
for the Geneva peace talks. By the end of 
the year, the joint command had become 
defunct. None of the Arab countries sup-
posedly on board gave it serious practical 
backing, with each country regarding cer-
tain members of staff in the nascent com-
mand as untrustworthy or ideologically 
unsuitable. 
A major divide has centered on rebel 
connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Qatari and Turkish support for the Brother-
hood has pitted the two countries against 
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates with-
in the MOC. Lacking the financial might of 
Gulf countries, Jordan still punches above 
its weight in the shaping of the Southern 
Front. Jordan also hosts US squadrons that 
attack Syrian Jihadists from its bases. In 
a deepening of the ideological rifts, in 
December 2016 the Yarmouk Army, one 
of the large players within the Southern 
Front, announced the formation of a new 
alliance belonging to the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA). The FSA is an umbrella grouping of 
non-Jihadist rebels across the country that 
has seldom functioned as an organization 
since it was founded in 2011. But the Yar-
mouk Army has left the door open by not 
officially breaking off from the Southern 
Front. On the civilian side, the Brotherhood 
ended up dominating many of the opposi-
tion’s local councils in the south. Increas-
ing religiosity in the population amidst the 
violence played into the group’s hand on 
the local level. But there remain substantial 
civic organizations on the Hauran Plain 
that operate outside the Brotherhood’s 
influence. 
Meanwhile Israel, which is outside the 
MOC, has played a role Israeli officials 
describe as reliant on “soft power”. It has 
propped up some brigades to keep the 
peace on the Golan Heights front and pla-
cated others by receiving wounded civilians 
and fighters. The Israeli establishment does 
not want to see Iran or Hezbollah on the 
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Golan Heights frontier and has in general 
learned to live with the Sunni rebels, in-
cluding the more hardline ones. In a rare 
incident in November 2016, Israel said its 
troops killed four militants linked to the 
Yarmouk Martyrs Brigades, an IS affiliate, 
after they attacked an Israeli patrol on the 
Golan Heights. 
IS Rises from the Ashes 
The non-Jihadists in the south have been 
further undermined by having to fight a 
two-pronged war against the regime and IS. 
The group, under pressure in Iraq and east-
ern Syria, experienced a resurgence in the 
south in 2016. It remains on the periphery 
of the Hauran Plain, but it has reconsoli-
dated in its hub in the Yarmouk River 
basin. IS also has fighters based in al-Lajah, 
a rugged region between the governorates 
of Suwaida and Deraa. It appears to be aim-
ing to link its foothold in Lajah with for-
ward positions it has set up in al-Badiya, the 
semi-desert steppe extending to the border 
point where Syria, Jordan and Iraq meet. 
The Yarmouk River basin 
IS was on the verge of extinction on the 
Hauran Plain in 2015 after the top leader-
ship of its main affiliate, the Yarmouk 
Martyrs Brigades, was assassinated by the 
Nusra Front (SWP Comments 34/2016, July 
2016). A smaller affiliate, Jaish al-Jihad, 
was routed by the FSA, and a third affiliate, 
the Islamic Muthanna Movement, had suf-
fered high casualties. But the three groups 
consolidated in the Yarmouk River basin, 
which borders Jordan and the Golan 
Heights, in mid-2016. They formed the 
Army of Khaled bin al-Walid, named after 
the Arab Muslim commander who defeated 
the Byzantines in the area. 
In a boost to IS, a tactical alliance be-
tween the Southern Front and the Nusra 
Front in the Yarmouk River basin appears 
to have broken down. FSA units, needing 
all the support they could muster, fought 
along the same frontlines against IS for 
four months, until the Nusra Front scaled 
down its participation in July 2016. The 
pullout came as the US started to target the 
leadership of the Nusra Front in northern 
Syria more heavily. On social media, Jihad-
ist clerics also criticized the preoccupation 
with fighting IS in the south while the 
regime consolidated and the FSA weakened. 
The Nusra Front appears to view this as an 
opening to increase its support in the south 
by taking on the Assad regime. 
Despite IS’s many foes, the rough terrain 
and clan-based social mores of the area 
have played to its advantage. The Southern 
Front or anyone else taking on the group 
would require a heavy numerical advantage 
to wage a decisive battle against the 800 or 
so IS fighters in the Yarmouk River basin. 
The MOC has been pushing the Southern 
Front to take on IS, but not enough fighters 
appear willing to risk blood feuds with 
established families in the Yarmouk River 
basin, whose members have joined the IS 
affiliates. 
Al-Lajah 
Similar factors of terrain and society have 
protected IS in a foothold it has carved out 
in the volcanic al-Lajah region on the north-
eastern edge of Deraa. The region is inhab-
ited by Bedouins, many of whom have sided 
with the FSA, which has strengthened the 
Bedouins’ hands in historic land disputes 
with the Druze inhabitants in the nearby 
governorate of Suwaida. 
Al-Badiya 
The most marked IS movement of 2106 has 
been its buildup in the expanse of Badiya 
region to the east of Suwaida. This trian-
gular area stretches from the town of al-
Dumair, northeast of Damascus, to Suwaida 
and on to the point where the Syrian, Iraqi 
and Jordanian borders meet. FSA sources 
have been observing an influx of IS fighters 
from the Euphrates River basin into the 
Badiya. The group has set up posts at water 
resources, in areas that could serve as 
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supply points, and in cave territory that 
provides natural cover. IS’s recapture of the 
desert city of Palmyra from the regime in 
December 2016 could enhance supply lines 
to Badiya. The group appears to be prepar-
ing the region as an alternative base for 
redeployment in case the largest two cities 
under its control – the Iraqi city of Mosul 
and the Syrian city of Raqqa – should fall. 
Strategy of Local Liquidations 
Lacking the depth and outright numbers to 
mount a pincer movement on the Hauran 
Plain, IS has resorted to assassinations of 
FSA commanders on the village and town 
level to weaken the FSA at its core. Scores of 
FSA officers, most of whom were affiliated 
with the Southern Front, were targeted in 
2016. With the objective of undermining 
opposition structures, the campaign has 
also targeted officials in the opposition’s 
Syrian Interim Government and the justice 
system (Dar al-‘Adel), which in rebel areas 
have replaced the regime. One of the more 
spectacular assassinations linked to IS came 
close to wiping out the top military and 
civic tier of the opposition in the south 
when a young suicide bomber blew himself 
up at a ceremony marking the opening of 
a police station in the town of Ankhil. The 
attack in September 2016 killed 16 people, 
including Yacoub Ammar, the minister 
for local administration in the opposition 
government. The rest of the dead were 
mostly members of the Hamza Division, 
a Southern Front formation. 
The Scramble Against IS 
The United States, Jordan and other MOC 
members rushed to respond to the IS ad-
vances in Badiya largely by building new 
forces outside the Southern Front with 
little familiarity with the local terrain. So 
far, these have amounted to little more 
than mercenary forces more interested in 
making quick money through the weapons 
trade or other smuggling than in getting 
involved in serious combat. 
With IS potentially straddling a long 
stretch of the Jordanian border, Jordan has 
set its own proxies to create a buffer in the 
Badiya region. But their fighting ability 
remains largely modest. One hastily put 
together group, the US and Jordanian-
backed New Syrian Army, failed in its debut 
in March 2016 to make a dent against IS in 
the Syrian town of al-Tanf, despite being 
supported by US airstrikes. Three months 
later, a desert camp belonging to the New 
Syrian Army was hit by what the US has 
described as a Russian air strike. By the 
end of the year, the group had dwindled 
in numbers from a few hundred to a few 
dozen. Another force has been the Army 
of the Clans (Jaish al-Asha’er), a Jordanian 
proxy led by Rakan al-Khudair, a former 
businessman from Deraa who tried to 
mediate a peaceful solution to grievances 
of Deraa in 2011 and was rebuffed by the 
regime. Jordan assigned the Army of the 
Clans, along with other proxies, to policing 
the Rukban border refugee camp and al-
Hadalat, a smaller camp that had sprung 
in the Badiya as Jordan continued in its 
refusal to let in the refugees. 
By contrast, one group with a track re-
cord of fighting IS was the Forces of Martyr 
Ahmad al-‘Abdu, which belongs to the 
Southern Front. The unit received strong 
support from the MOC until their leader 
Bakkour al-Salim was killed at his camp in 
Badiya in a suicide attack blamed on IS. 
Bakkour was also part of the opposition’s 
peace-talks team. His rebel group could not 
compensate for his death and lost its luster. 
Missing Incentives for Fighting IS 
The Western response to the IS advances in 
the south has been mostly to replicate the 
approach the US employed in northern 
Syria with the Kurdish PYD militia (the 
Syrian branch of the Turkish PKK). It mainly 
consists of arms, air support and political 
cover. Washington has shown little objec-
tion to the militia’s drive for a Kurdish 
territorial and political ascendency in 
northern Syria. In the mainly Arab Sunni 
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south, US support for the rebels’ cause – the 
toppling of the Assad regime – has been far 
less consistent. Even while Washington 
was facilitating the supply of the Southern 
Front with weapons, it made it clear that, 
as long as the Southern Front was commit-
ted to fighting Assad, it would not receive 
any air support even against IS. Diplomati-
cally, Washington has been paying lip ser-
vice since 2015 to a political transition that 
could ease the grip of Assad and his pre-
dominantly Alawite entourage on the state 
and security apparatus. Yet, on the south-
ern local scene, the Assad regime has had a 
free hand to hit town after town while the 
mainly Sunni would-be recruits were ex-
pected to forego any retribution and fight 
IS – even though IS was not responsible for 
the destruction in their communities. 
While Washington was willing to extend a 
de-facto safe zone over Kurdish regions to 
prevent regime air attacks when the PYD 
clashed briefly with Assad’s forces in al-
Hasaka (northeastern Syria) in August 2016, 
it has shown no inclination to do so in the 
south. With little motivation among Sunnis 
to fight their IS coreligionists, few observers 
have confidence in the ability of the Jor-
danian-backed auxiliaries to fight an all-out 
war against IS. 
Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and IS 
seem to have adopted a strategy of avoiding 
confrontation with each other in the south. 
Even if IS, driven by a quest for resources, 
were to push through Badiya to the agri-
culturally more productive Suwaida region, 
the regime would be unlikely to commit 
significant troops to defending Druze popu-
lation centers in Suwaida if they came 
under a concerted IS attack, as this would 
raise the possibility of intervention by 
Israel. The Druze of Israel have members in 
the Israeli army, and the Israel has signaled 
that it would consider military action to 
protect the Druze in Syria. 
This leaves the Assad regime with a 
balance of power. Flush from the capture 
of Aleppo, it would like to build on this 
momentum by showing that it will live up 
to its commitment to regain the whole of 
Syria. But in the south, Russia is unlikely to 
give Assad a green light, or unleash bom-
bardments on the scale it deployed in the 
north to allow pro-Assad forces to retake 
large tracts of territory. If Russia levels 
more rebel ground from the air, Hezbollah 
and Iran could reach the Golan Heights 
frontier – something both Moscow and 
Israel oppose. New refugees could also put 
more pressure on Jordan, with which 
Moscow is keen to maintain good ties. But 
the regime could still pursue its strategy of 
trying to take towns one by one, or seek a 
symbolic victory, such as capturing a bor-
der crossing with Jordan. One vulnerable 
spot, due to the regime’s presence in the 
city, is a crossing point on the southern 
outskirts of Deraa. 
Options for External Actors 
The countries nominally supporting the 
Syrian opposition stood by as Russia and 
the Assad regime destroyed East Aleppo. 
Now they will have the chance to take a 
more active part in preventing a meltdown 
in the south that could cause mass dis-
placement and loss of life, and have huge 
geopolitical repercussions. 
Southern Syria is too important strategi-
cally to let the Southern Front lose its role 
as the lynchpin of the region’s rebels. A 
Jihadi takeover or Hezbollah advance would 
risk triggering an Israeli intervention to 
shield its forces on the Golan Heights and 
in the Israeli interior and/or to protect the 
Druze in Suwaida. Jordan could also be 
drawn into sending troops into southern 
Syria as the establishment faces an increas-
ingly fragile situation domestically. 
Even if chances of success are low, efforts 
should be made to get Moscow to keep its 
planes from doling out more destruction 
and at least preserve the existing front 
lines. In its operations in the south, Moscow 
has yielded to a de-facto Israeli veto on how 
far it can go and will most likely not allow 
for an open Iranian corridor stretching 
from Iran to the Golan Heights. 
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Moscow also needs to be reminded that a 
stable Jordan is in everyone’s interests and 
that maintaining a balance of power in the 
south prevents more pressure from being 
put on Jordan in terms of refugees and the 
rise of Jihadism next doors. 
Given the regime’s post-Aleppo euphoria 
and the mounting Iranian influence within 
loyalist circles, Assad might be tempted to 
re-conquer the south, starting with the line 
of control with Israel (Qunaitira) and the 
border crossings with Jordan. Western 
reactions to Aleppo are therefore crucial, 
including symbolically, for the future 
dynamics in the south. As the regime was 
gloatingly delivering the fatal blow in 
Aleppo, a helpless and divided EU declared 
that it would help to reconstruct Syria 
provided the country moved toward a 
political transition – which no one in West-
ern policy-making seriously believes is 
likely with Assad so strengthened. Instead 
of resigning itself to an “Assad-only future”, 
the EU could turn its attention to protect-
ing the contiguous civic structures that 
have so far escaped annihilation by the re-
gime, most widely in the south. 
Europe could contribute to stabilizing 
the rebel regions and limiting the appeal of 
Jihadists to local populations by restoring 
the Southern Front as the bulwark against 
Assad. A trust deficit between Washington 
and the rebels has prevented FSA units 
from being extended the dedicated backing 
enjoyed by the Kurdish militia in the north. 
Deepening the scope of military support 
could prevent the regime from making 
even symbolic victories and would send a 
signal to the southern population that they 
will not be abandoned. Building trust with 
the opposition and local population and 
strengthening the Southern Front may be 
the only effective measure against the pos-
sible relocation of massive IS contingents 
from Iraq and the Euphrates River Valley to 
Badiya and beyond. 
Here again, the streamlining of inter-
national backing would help unify the local 
structures and make them more demo-
cratic. It also needs to be recognized that, 
despite Assad’s recent advances, the Syrian 
conflict could yet continue for the long 
term. The creation of an overall interna-
tional organization based in Jordan, with 
the donors and backers as its members, 
could help manage the flows of aid and 
civic support, and make it easier for the 
support to get through Jordan to its desti-
nation. Jordan’s security concerns have 
lessened its initial welcome of the Syrian 
opposition after the revolt. As more region-
al actors have got involved in the Syrian 
conflict, Jordan has sometimes put the 
peaceful civic activists as well as the officers 
who have fled there who lack connections 
with influential patrons in its own version 
of the Soviet Hotel Lux. With the unspoken 
threat of being thrown back into Syria 
hanging over them, they have little room 
to maneuver independently or open lines 
of contact and act as liaisons to help the 
regions they came from. Their situation 
could be normalized if efforts were made to 
solve the animosity hanging over the rela-
tions between the Arab MOC members. 
Militarily and politically, little could be 
achieved to streamline the MOC without 
the weight of the US. It is not clear if the 
incoming US Administration will listen to 
advice from the established governments of 
Europe, especially as more refugees would 
boost Trump-style politics on the continent. 
But it is essential for the Trump team to get 
the message that the fight against terror 
needs to go beyond the ongoing air cam-
paign and support for the Kurdish militia 
if it is to stop the Jihadists and IS from 
becoming the only game in town for those 
opposing the regime. 
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